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ASSESSING SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES AND RECOVERY TIME  
USING OPEN RESOURCES: ELEMENTS OF TECHNIQUE AND RESULTS 
 
Modern vulnerability resources are considered, their content, security and recovery time of different software 
products are analyzed. To make the process smoother and more efficient three main stages are distinguished: 
source overview, general security and severity analysis, and more detailed vulnerability consideration including 
recovery time. The proposed approach is universal and can be used for almost any software projects and systems. 
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Introduction 
The number of discovered vulnerabilities is increasing 
every day compelling software companies to be always 
on the alert to provide immediate protection. It is particu-
larly important for web servers since they have always 
been very attractive targets for malicious attacks [1]. The 
term “zero-day exploit” as well as “zero-day protection” 
has gained widespread popularity as it often refers to ex-
tremely effective attacks that are really difficult to defend 
against. However, according to the CERT Institute, 99% 
of network attacks leverage known vulnerabilities [2]. 
The situation is especially critical when it comes to secu-
rity problems as nowadays security is considered one of 
the essentials of good computer systems. And that is why 
different security vulnerability groups, researchers, data-
bases and testing tools have been actively growing and 
developing in recent five years.  
In this paper we examine several most sophisticated 
vulnerability resources, analyze their structure and con-
tent and use the provided information to compare sev-
eral world-popular products in terms of failures, severity 
and recovery time (here by failure we mean vulnerabil-
ity report). Our focus is primarily on the security issues 
as they are at the heart of all system threats and viola-
tions. But of course non-security bugs shouldn’t be ne-
glected and in our future works we are going to take 
them into consideration as well.  
The paper is structured into three main sections. Sec-
tion 1 provides a brief overview of the existing vulner-
ability resources, Sections 2 and 3 present the key con-
tribution of this paper – content processing and security 
analysis based on the obtained data, where Section 2 
describes the main approach and provides general vul-
nerability and severity assessment while Section 3 
works with more specific information and presents more 
detailed vulnerability results. All the presentations are 
given using Apache and IIS web servers as an example. 
The paper ends with a summary, concluding remarks 
and statement of possible future work. 
Overview of software vulnerability  
data resources  
CSI/FBI (Computer Security Institute) study found 
that 90% of the respondents were impacted by security 
breaches. Of those who suffered a breach, 70% said the 
breaches were serious resulting in theft of proprietary 
information, financial fraud or sabotage of their data or 
networks [2]. And all these problems could have been 
avoided if people had taken proactive steps to eliminate 
the multitude of already discovered and published sys-
tem vulnerabilities. There are number of resources spe-
cially designed to help identify and solve the known 
security problems before a hacker takes advantage of 
them. CVE, NVD, Secunia, SecurityFocus, OVAL, 
CERT – it is not a complete list of such vulnerability 
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channels.  Below we review the most popular of them, 
used in further vulnerability analysis.  
CVE. Maintained by Mitre, CVE is not a stand-
alone database but rather a dictionary of standardized 
names for vulnerabilities and other information security 
exposures. CVE aims to standardize the names for all 
publicly known vulnerabilities and security exposures. 
Its goal is to make easier to share data across separate 
vulnerability databases and security tools. The content 
of CVE is a result of collaborative work of various secu-
rity experts; the resource is free and funded by US gov-
ernment. Absolute majority of all vulnerability re-
sources are based on and synchronized with the CVE 
vulnerability naming standard. 
NVD. The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
is one of the most sophisticated vulnerability channels 
that integrates all publicly available U.S. government 
vulnerability resources. It contains more that 22,000 
vulnerability entries with about 22 new ones added 
every day. NVD is based on CVE and synchronize all 
its updates with CVE dictionary. Severity scores are 
assigned using the Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys-
tem standard. NVD's vulnerability information is avail-
able for free to the public as an xml feed. 
Secunia. A Danish commercial organization, that 
provides internet security services and offers software 
products for tracking computer viruses and security vul-
nerabilities. The Secunia research staff test, verify, vali-
date and assess public vulnerability reports, also con-
ducting their own research in various products. The dis-
covered vulnerabilities are reported to the vendors who 
issue updates and actively co-operate with the Secunia 
Research team.  
The resource also provides a free web based infor-
mation database with a good search that can yield the 
list of particular product vulnerabilities, show their se-
verity range and indicate whether the patches are avail-
able, draw diagrams and provide other visual informa-
tion representation. 
Security failure analysis. Elements  
of analysis technique 
Although many trusted security data recourses exist, 
we decided in favor of National vulnerability database 
(NVD) due to its large vulnerability base and well-
structured data provided in xml format. For our analysis its 
content was parsed and CVE vulnerability indices, publish 
dates and severity scores for each particular product were 
picked out. Then product security characteristics were 
compared in terms of the number of discovered vulner-
abilities and total severity rates, the information was visual-
ized and the obtained results were analyzed. 
For our work two rival (free and commercial) soft-
ware - Apache and IIS servers were chosen as very se-
curity-conscious and very popular products in the mod-
ern engineering. To be precise, we were interested in 
1.3, 2.0, 2.2 Apache branches (2.1 is omitted as an in-
ternal development version never released officially) 
from “Apache Software Foundation” or 
“Apache.Group” vendors and 5.x (5.0 and 5.1), 6.0 IIS 
versions from “Microsoft” company. The retrieved data 
refer to “Apache”, “Apache HTTP Server” and “IIS”, 
“Internet Information Services” product names for 
Apache and IIS servers respectively. 
Having parsed the database content a summary table 
is compiled for each software branch in the following 
format (Table 1). 
Combining the obtained results, we get the bar 
graphs that illustrate the comparison of three Apache 
and two IIS branches (fig.1 and fig.2). 
Table 1 
The database content for each software branch 
 
CVE ID Published Severity CVSS_Score Apache branch 
CVE-2002-0843 11.10.2002 High 8 1.3 
CVE-2003-0460 27.08.2003 Low 3,3 1.3 
CVE-2003-0542 03.11.2003 Medium 4,9 1.3 
CVE-2003-0987 03.03.2004 High 7 1.3 
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Fig. 1. Severity rate of Apache vulnerabilities calculated for each month 
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Fig. 2. Severity rate of IIS vulnerabilities calculated for each month 
 
Graphs show total severity rates of the discovered 
bugs for each month from January 2000 through De-
cember 2006. The colors indicate each branch’s contri-
bution to the total severity value. It is calculated as 
1
N
m n
n
S S==∑ , where mS  represents a total severity rate 
assessed within one month, N is the number of vulner-
abilities found during this month and nS  is the rate of 
n-th severity. Proceeding from Alhazmi-Malaiya work 
[1] and fitting vulnerabilities data for each Apache 
branch to the time-based model, will give us the follow-
ing results (fig. 3). 
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Fig. 3. Graph of cumulative number of vulnerabilities 
It is clearly seen that the slope of the graph for 
Apache 2.0 is steeper. Steep graph shows higher vul-
nerability consistence than that of 1.3 version. You can 
read the growth rate directly from the slope of the 
graph: For example, in May 2002, when the first 
Apache 2.0 version was released, the number of 
Apache 1.3 vulnerabilities already made 15, but in 
November 2004 Apache 2.0 came up with Apache 1.3 
and then outrun the old version. Now if we examine 
severity ranges assigned to the same vulnerabilities by 
different resources we can find great dissimilarity as 
the methods of evaluation are not identical and even 
not exactly comparable. Secunia provides criticality 
graphs on its web site so we decided to present similar 
illustrations for NVD database vulnerabilities (fig. 4). 
It is easy to see that the majority of discovered vulner-
abilities, luckily, has low severity. The most serious 
security loopholes were disclosed in 1.3 branch though 
it is excusable as 1.3 is the first and the most long-
lived Apache version.  
In addition, it is worth noting that the great number of 
found loopholes are not branch-specific and pose a threat 
to all the current product versions. That means that source 
code is often reused and the existing or potential vulner-
abilities pass through different software branches.  
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Recovery time analysis 
As a rule researchers discussing product security fo-
cus their attention on the number of found vulnerabili-
ties considering it a kind of a dependability rate. Some-
times severity score is mentioned. But to obtain a com-
plete dependability description of a certain product, 
other important factors must be taken into account. The 
one we are going to consider is the amount of time it 
takes for a vendor to prepare a patch and return back to 
normal secure operation after a vulnerability report. We 
call it “recovery time” as vulnerability disclosure is very 
similar in its essence to system failure. On their web site 
eEye Digital Security company wrote that “The window 
of time to remediate new vulnerabilities has shrunk to 
just hours, compared to months in the past.” We decided 
to investigate this question and analyze the recovery 
time needed for Apache and Microsoft companies to fix 
the reported vulnerabilities.  
The time of vulnerability disclosure is defined differ-
ently in the security community and industry. Usually, 
vulnerability information is discussed in mailing lists and 
only then is approved and published as a security advi-
sory. The time it appears in different databases often dif-
fers and this nonoccurrence can make up several years. 
So to get the correct discovery time information we de-
cided to use CVE library since it is the most reliable and 
standardized resource other databases are based on. 
Patches and updates are maintained by software vendors 
and so the dates of fixes for our products are available in 
Apache Security Reports and IIS Microsoft Security Bul-
letins. Having all the necessary information at our dis-
posal, we can now extend product detail tables to look 
like table 2.  
The improved graph (Fig. 5) takes proper account of 
recovery time and shows the cumulative severity of all 
the discovered and non-fixed bugs at each period of time. 
The review of Apache products clearly shows that 
Apache 2.0 has always been the least stable branch with a 
lot of security loopholes while time-proved Apache 1.3 
version is pretty reliable and secure. Apache 2.2 branch 
was released relatively recently, and as it is not yet popu-
lar there is no tangible benefit of vulnerability discovery 
and exploitation. IIS 5.0 proved itself to be the most sta-
ble and reliable web server over the last three years, how-
ever, you can see that it had a lot of security problems in 
the past.  
Table 2 
ȿxtend product 
CVE ID 
Published 
(NVD) 
Discovered 
(CVE-mitre) 
Fixed 
(Apache report) 
Recovery 
time (days) 
Secu-
nia rate 
NVD 
rate 
Apache 
branch 
CVE-2002-0843 11.10.2002 08.08.2002 03.10.2002 56 3 8 1,3 
CVE-2003-0460 27.08.2003 26.06.2003 18.07.2003 22 2 3,3 1,3 
CVE-2003-0542 03.11.2003 14.07.2003 27.10.2003 105 2 4,9 1,3 
CVE-2003-0987 03.03.2004 16.12.2003 12.05.2004 148 2 7 1,3 
 
Apache 2.0 severity
Low
Medium
High
 
Apache 1.3 severity
Low
Medium
High
 
Apache 2.2 severity
Low
Medium
High
IIS 5.x severity
Low
Medium
High
IIS 6.0 severity
Low
Medium
 
Fig. 4. Pie charts illustrating the distribution of severity groups 
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Fig. 5. Graph of cumulative vulnerability severity 
 
Its proximate successor – IIS6 also shows good 
promise in terms of security. 
Comparing IIS and Apache product recovery time 
shows that in average open Apache community takes  
84 days to fix the reported vulnerability.  
It is twice more than that of commercial Microsoft 
organization. 
Conclusion 
In this paper different vulnerability resources were 
considered to evaluate and compare product security. 
The approach used represents a general solution that 
makes comparing security vulnerabilities possible. The 
method is generic and can be applied to the wide range 
of software products. When used for Apache and IIS 
http servers, it demonstrates the comparison between an 
open source and commercial software in terms of secure 
operation. Both analyzed organizations have good po-
tentialities to create reliable and secure software. It 
should be emphasized that proceeding with other re-
courses, for example [1], allows us to analyze not only 
the number of discovered vulnerabilities but their sever-
ity and recovery time and, therefore, to estimate the 
product security as a whole.  
Further research is needed to evaluate the non-
security issues and estimate its contribution to the whole 
software dependability.  
The proposed technique can also be extended for ser-
vice-oriented architectures and other complex software 
component-based systems if it is necessary to consider 
the system dependability as a whole. 
References 
1. Sung-Whan Woo, Omar H. Alhazmi, Yashwant 
K. Malaiya. Assessing Vulnerabilities in Apache and 
IIS HTTP Servers. 2006. – 240 ɪ.  
2. Network Security and Vulnerability Assessment 
[ȿɥɟɤɬɪɨɧ. ɪɟɫɭɪɫ]. – Ɋɟɠɢɦ ɞɨɫɬɭɩɭ: www.eeye. 
com, February 2007. 
3.  Mitre Corp, Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sures [ȿɥɟɤɬɪɨɧ. ɪɟɫɭɪɫ]. – Ɋɟɠɢɦ ɞɨɫɬɭɩɭ:  http:// 
www.cve.mitre.org/, February 2007. 
4. Vulnerability and Virus Information [ȿɥɟɤɬɪɨɧ. 
ɪɟɫɭɪɫ]. – Ɋɟɠɢɦ ɞɨɫɬɭɩɭ: http://secunia.com, Febru-
ary 2007. 
5. National Vulnerability Database [ȿɥɟɤɬɪɨɧ. ɪɟ-
ɫɭɪɫ]. – Ɋɟɠɢɦ ɞɨɫɬɭɩɭ: http://nvd.nist.gov/, February 
2007. 
6. Apache Software Foundation Bug System [ȿɥɟɤ-
ɬɪɨɧ. ɪɟɫɭɪɫ]. – Ɋɟɠɢɦ ɞɨɫɬɭɩɭ: http://issues. apache. 
org/bugzilla/, February 2007. 
7. An Open Online Encyclopedia [ȿɥɟɤɬɪɨɧ. ɪɟɫɭɪɫ]. – 
Ɋɟɠɢɦ ɞɨɫɬɭɩɭ: http://en.wikipedia.org, February 2007. 
8. Apache Security Updates [ȿɥɟɤɬɪɨɧɧɢɣ ɪɟɫɭɪɫ]. – 
Ɋɟɠɢɦ ɞɨɫɬɭɩɭ: http://httpd.apache.org/security_ re-
port.html, February 2007. 
9. Microsoft Security Bulletin [ȿɥɟɤɬɪɨɧ. ɪɟɫɭɪɫ]. – 
Ɋɟɠɢɦ ɞɨɫɬɭɩɭ: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/se-
curity/bulletin, February 2007. 
 
Наɞɿɣшɥа ɞо рɟɞаɤцɿʀ 5.03.2007 
 
Рецензент: ɞ-ɪ ɬɟɯɧ. ɧаɭɤ, ɩɪɨɮ. В.Ɇ. Иɥюɲɤɨ, ɇа-
ɰіɨɧаɥьɧɢɣ аɟɪɨɤɨɫɦіɱɧɢɣ ɭɧіɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬ іɦ. Ɇ.Є. ɀɭ-
ɤɨɜɫьɤɨɝɨ «ХАІ», Хаɪɤіɜ. 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Ja
n-
00
Ma
y-0
0
Se
p-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ma
y-0
1
Se
p-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ma
y-0
2
Se
p-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ma
y-0
3
Se
p-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ma
y-0
4
Se
p-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ma
y-0
5
Se
p-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ma
y-0
6
Se
p-0
6 t
S
1,3
2.0
2.2
IIS 5.x
IIS 6.0
